This 'essay' is taken from my PhD thesis. As it dates back to 1994 it is a little tired now as so much has changed since writing it... but fundamentally the main material remains valid. I have excised, as best I can, forward and backward references to other material in the thesis.
The
problem I am about to try and tackle (or at least a technological variation of
it) can be put simply - if you can't say what art and design is now, how can
you say what it's going to be? Well we know (unless the twentieth century has
eluded us) that both software and hardware can carry culturally signifying
content. Of itself this is not sufficient to define what product might be
considered art, what design. Neither is the presence of culture enough to tidily
meet or reveal the biased presence of an anthropological, sociological or
critical gaze. The conclusion must be that if we try to rationally define what
are the measures of a cultural product, rather than simply observe their variety,
then we start with the usual postmodern mess. This causes a problem if we wish
to speculate about future art and design in a digital era. It is also a
problem if we wish to
sensibly observe the evolution of contemporary practices, because a language of
definition and a framework of classification is not available to us. The usual
discursive solution is to wait for history and statistics. Where then do we go?
If
we try to work out what are the distinguishing features of art or design we must
first formulate the appropriate types of question and seek appropriate
references. This at least is the common route and it leads toward questioning
what is the mechanism of approval and what the nature of content. That is to say
how is a work of art or the work of design recognised as such. Also what is it
in a work of art or design that marks it as one. This leads to philosophical
difficulties quite difficult to resolve and, already I think, objections to my
last two sentences. The presence of these difficulties forces us to be more
specific about what we seek to know and why. Challenged by utility our first
question therefore might be modified to - do we need to have an explanation
of the mechanism of approval ?; and our second thus - do we need
to know what it is that is the mark of a
work of art or design? Our original question was as to how future technology
might alter the nature of art and design products and whether this would alter
the notion of them as disciplines or practice. From this, and in a continued
spirit of utility, it would seem we might also need - can we explain how art
and design forms emerge? and - can their emergence perturb what we
believe art and design to be?
It
is here, in the comparison of these questions, that we can slip the net of
discussion based around the qualities of products. Those infinite regresses like
is it art? The ruse is a follows - rather than address the mechanism of approval
we might only accept that the mechanism exists, that in various ways and at
different times there can be a collective acceptance that something is indeed a
work of art or is a design. Secondly what marks a work of art or design is tied
in to the explication of the mechanism of approval, if therefore we choose not
to understand the nature of approval we also exclude discourse about the mark of
the work. This stratagem provokes another question which is - are our remaining
questions sufficient to allow us to reflect on the nature of future product and
its effect? By way of an answer and for the remainder of this essay I shall
develop a model of how makers respond to and develop a notion of form through
practice, in particular a model which attributes a central role to the means of
production and is extensible to new technologies.
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TECHNOLOGY AND THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL FORM In
figure 1 we see an outline of how the emergence of cultural form and genre may
be generally related to the point at which the functionality of a technology
begins to exceed its base function. Drawing on an explanation
of
function and functionality, base function indicates the original and usually
quite clear purpose for which a technology was made e.g.
in the case of computers to perform calculations. Similarly functionality
indicates the ergonomy of a piece of technology in relation to its
function. But
it indicates something else as well, the process of making something easier or
faster to do... calls for changes in the formulation of a technology, different
parts and different processes. There may also be the introduction of
complementary technology or incidental functions.
Enhanced
functionality provides, at first, for an increase in the range of possible
solutions to a given task, either over time or cost or in relation to the
ability to apply and develop skill. It may also indicate to the user other tasks
that may be undertaken using the technology based on their awareness of
increased performance or incidental functions. This expressive or, at least,
discriminative capacity which the technology permits relates then to the
emergence of a predictive space for
the artist or designer in respect of the type, form and concerns of work they
can undertake. Such changes are also likely to affect the alert technologist who
devises and modifies the technology. So too we can assume that an element of the
predictive space for the artist/designer begins to become an interpretive space
for the viewer/consumer. The
awarenesses and practises that arise as a consequence of increased functionality
begin to constitute a
cultural superstructure beyond technical expediency. In its final stage,
repeated iterations of task/product/consumption generates a recognition of a
cultural form/genre and consequently a requirement on the part of the
practitioner not only to use the 'medium' in an expressive way but to adhere
to contemporary cultural expectation with regard to style and content while
'marking
out territory'. This last stage continues with the legitimisation of forms of
content and their treatment or stylisation. Except in the case of radical
alterations to the technological environment the model reaches a point of
dynamic stasis in this last stage. The technology is therefore at this point
seen to be 'resolved' and there is an ideal or notion (at least in relation to
new technology) of transparent use, Alan Kay's get it in '5 seconds'. As
explanation this model is not meant to purport causality and technological
determinism, although it could be interpreted as such. To seek such an
explanation in conventional art , design or media history would be quite
difficult as it represents an analysis unnecessary to them and overlooks the
conflation of cultural trends, how one mediums concerns arise out of another's
and the evolutionary concerns of histories. However such a model is necessary in
order to isolate the One good recent example of the model would be the various transitions and developments that took place in the television post production industry, starting with clumsy or difficult character generators for adding captions, through to modest computer graphics and finally the expectation with various paintbox technologies for highly innovative graphics and animation. Initially a role for the most technical of technicians with a perfunctory role, in the space of twenty years video and film graphics became an arena for the artist and the boffin.
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Qualifying
CAAD
If
the model in figure 1 is sufficient as an explanation of the emergence of
cultural form through the use of technology and through practice then we are in
a position to ask the next question. Is there any reason to suppose the use of
new technology will cause products to arise that alter the notions of art and
design? There is perhaps a simpler formulation of this as two separate
questions. First is figure 1 as appropriate to new technology as it is to old
technology? If it isn't then we might be right in thinking that the fundamental
nature of practice will change and consequently our understanding of art and
design. Secondly are the products of new technology going to be completely
different to old technology art and design products?
In
figure 1 there are three phases indicated in the state of art and design praxis
during the development of a technology. Roughly speaking these rest on the
relationship that as a technology gets easier to use, it is possible to be more
expressive with it. Similarly as the expressive scope increases, social concerns
arising from the mechanism of approval and the mark of the object begin to
intervene and issues of genre and style arise. Our task is to see whether such
stages are applicable to computer technology and perhaps to make some commentary
on varying ways the model itself can be applied.
Before
proceeding it is as well to consider the range of potential refinements in the
application of the model as an interpretive schema. The first of these concern...when do we consider a technology or a particular formulation of it as a
production artefact to be new? The second concern...what we imply by expression
and expressive capability. The third...the terms of
classifying cultural form. Obviously from this the potential range of
interpretation the model affords becomes immense, more than can be dealt with
here. It is therefore necessary to introduce qualifying factors to the model as
we proceed.
In
respect of the newness of a technology it can be taken that there is a
difference between a technology which has been appropriated or received by art
and design (which historically have tended to be general material and service
technologies) and one which has been specifically formulated for it in respect
of an identified art and design function (e. g.
looms, press and print technologies). Specific formulations may be
traceable to the point of their inception but appropriation confronts us with
the problem that aspects of use, and hence the verity of our model, may have
already been developed or resolved by the group in original possession of the
technology. Computer technology is one that art and design has appropriated, its
original function of course being calculation. As to whether the pattern of
computer use had already been set by others, the involvement of art and design
with computing was relatively early, during the period of the development of
high-level languages. Also the separate phases of computer technology have been
qualitatively quite distinct and in various ways unconnected. Consequently I
feel it tolerable to say that computing was not a late appropriation for art and
design and the experience of the technology was indeed of something quite 'new',
at least as new as it felt to computer scientists.
As
to the idea of freedom of expression in the use of a technology it is necessary
to distinguish between the possible permutations within a given formulaic
range and an increase or alteration in the formulaic range. This can be
illustrated by reference to typography and typographic technology. There are
many identifiable technological stages appropriate to typography, manual, carved
blocks, movable type, letterpress and lithography, photogravure and computer
typesetting etc. For each of these stages we could not say there is a dearth of
typographic variety or progressively in each that there have not been aesthetic
peaks and troughs. However what has been true for each stage is that a different
relationship between the notion of typography, other forms within printing and
the definition of cultural product has been conceivable or visibly latent e.g.
the book, the map, the poster, multicoloured type, montage would all have
different formulation according to the speed, difficulty of use or
sophistication of the typographical system available. Thus the relationships of
potential constitute the formulaic range at a given time with a given technology
and each technology redefines the contemporary formulaic range.
The
aesthetic and formal variety which is possible within a formulaic range is the
currency we accept in the mechanism of approval and the mark of the object for
art or design. Consequently expressive variety and the ability of artists and
designers to express themselves are seen purely in terms of formulaic ranges,
expressive freedom is therefore certified enabled by creative genius, the
freedom of the artist to do and think as they please. Equally genre and cultural
form in one fell swoop escape the exacting environments of material and personal
practice because within the formulaic range there is seen to be difference and
hence the liberty of choice.
So
we come to the last of our qualifying criteria which is this relationship
between expression and genre. Here however I wish to put another emphasis on the
terms creative freedom or freedom of expression, which is that of a technicist
understanding. In this view the nature of what you use and how you can use
it defines but also limits what is possible. In a sense this is that a thing has
a qualitative identity which will assert itself when that thing is used. Understanding such qualitative identities is often what the work of art and
design is about. This technicist formulation of expressive freedom is rarely
soundly put and is generally rolled into a technicist notion of determinism i.e. you can only do what the
machine / it allows you to. The consequent loss of subtlety allows for a rather
facile notion of artistic freedoms and the all too easy forgetting that
engagement with anything exacts a price and a change. Resultantly I would assert
that genres are constitutive of formulaic range, they are what is possible
through the technology as much as a chosen form of expression. Of course the
popularity of the genres and of the technology itself i.e.
the cause of its choice by the artist or designer is a slightly different
matter and does not concern us here.
We
can now return to the appraisal of computer technology in accordance with figure
1. In respect of the questions about 'newness' of computer technology, I have
already given the answer, it remains to be considered however, concerning
expressive capability and cultural form, whether computer technology diverges in
any respect from the model. The interpretive key, from what has so far been
said, is the notion of a technology's formulaic range.
The
social linkage of art and design practice inevitably means that in transitional
stages between technologies, matters of style and attitudes toward practice
allow for gradual changes in the nature and appearance of product. We can
therefore expect the introduction of any production technology (however radical)
initially to be replete with what is essentially art and design mimicry or the
continuation of a cultural agenda. Only over a period of time and the reflexive
development of practices associated with a technology will its milieu become
apparent. The often cited example of this is of course photography. Therefore
what can be identified as uniquely applicable to a technology is not strictly
speaking any one or more genre/cultural form but what has been described as its
formulaic range. This is because genres have a tendency to migrate or propagate,
they are culturally controlled whilst the formulaic range is dependent on the
'physicality'
of a technology.
The
formulaic range itself is consequent upon the following process - a technology
is constructed for an identified function, its operation is through defined
parameters of functionality, as the functionality is either increased or better
understood the technology is seen to be applicable to other functions. The
formulaic range is hence the potential functions (in a sense applications) of a
technology but is more exactly defined by the qualifying limits of that
technology. So for example the potential functions of film technology, on its
own, are premised on visual or optical functions which constitutes a huge range
of functions. Working in conjunction with other technologies, film is a central
cultural technology, perhaps it is as well too central to serve as an indicator
of formulaic range, other technologies like engraving equipment likely to prove
a better challenge to the reader's interpretive skills.
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THE FORMULAIC RANGE OF COMPUTER AIDED ART AND DESIGN The
formulaic range of CAAD technology raises a fantastic potential for academic
confusion and has consistently provoked grand statements from theorists and
practitioners alike. It would be foolhardy to attempt a classification of the
known functions, functionalities, cultural products and applications associated
with CAAD and utter idiocy to attempt it for computers in general. Neither I
suspect would an overall review of the literature contribute much to an
understanding of CAAD's formulaic range. Instead we can look to one symptomatic
document Artist and Computer, a collection of responses from a variety of
CAAD practitioners and theorists, to a set of questions put by Ruth Leavitt in
1976 (Leavitt, 1976). It is as well to remember that at this stage in the
development of CAAD the idea and visibility of 'computer art' was strong
in comparison to design or indeed other nomenclatures of practice and
therefore there is an undue emphasis on the notion of art, a broader reading is
appropriate. In
compiling the book Leavitt seems to have had a number of intentions in mind, one
was to assert that the involvement of computers in the 'art' process didn't
mean boring, rigid, machine-like work that all looked the same. Apart from the
diverse selection of CAAD workers and their work she supported her defence on
the grounds that artistic authority was still at play "The
computer can function for the artist at many different levels. The artist has
only to choose what role he/she wishes the computer to play.
. . . The computer helps the artist to perceive in a new way. Its
features blend with those of its user to form a new type of art.
. . . Every program functions as a new set of tools. The type and quality
of work produced on the computer depend both on the artist who uses the machine
and the program. " (1976:VII) In
actuality and with hindsight the diversity which Leavitt chose to show and
posited as dependent on the individual qualities of the contributors remains a
seemingly unchanging diversity. Of Leavitt's contributors some undertook work
within the contemporary conventions of fine art (Tony Longson, Vera Molnar),
others worked within design / craft traditions like weave (Karen Huff). There were
strands that touched on AI and
robotics (Kurt Laukner, Edward Ihnatowicz) and the first rumblings of virtual
reality cast as 'cybernetic environments' (Aaron Marcus). The relationship
with film, animation and music (John Whitney, Herbert Franke), video (Joseph
Scala) and 3D modelling and CAD (Larry Elin) were all represented. This range of
work is substantially identical to that portrayed in glossy coffee-table books
about 'computer graphics' in the mid 1980's (for a typical example see (Jankel
and Morton, 1984)). It is unlikely that any contemporary overview of CAAD would
be much different in the classification and range of disciplines. On the basis
of a certain fixity over two decades it is not unreasonable to accept that the
notion of a formulaic range is an appropriate one to apply to CAAD technology.
There
are further revelations and testimony to be had
regarding the growing awareness toward the technology, its functionality
and the predictive capacity of users (Mallary, 1976) "Computer
art has yet to make much of an impact , but it will. In fact if I were not
confident of its future I would not be interested in computer art, because the
current level of performance is simply not that impressive. At this point I am
charitable in judging both my own work and that of others (the question I throw
back is: 'What good is a baby?') But as time goes on standards must, and
will, stiffen. Even now it is time to move beyond the easy gimmicks towards more
substantial achievements." (1976:8) But
the most visionary of the contributions to Leavitt's book is an essay provided by
Charles Csuri (Csuri, 1976) who identifies the central paradigm of data as being
that to which 'art' can respond and through which it can express (Csuri of
course makes the usual assumption that artists de facto deal with expression in
a way others don't). He takes the position that all data-definable aspects of
reality are raw material for the artist and that this is no aberration from
conventional, historical art practice "There
are many instances where artists have used the direct analysis of nature
(real-world data) to create art. . . Artists are constantly re-evaluating nature
(real-world data) searching for new modes to express some personally felt view
of the world and their relationship to it. One might suggest artists utilize
real-world data to express a view of reality through the application of
transformations to this data. . . Data for artistic expression includes the
numerical or statistical representation of the external world. . . unemployment,
crime, traffic accidents, divorce, mental illness, birth and death, alcoholics,
acreage of green space, pollution, longevity. . . " (1976:85) He
concludes that not only might artists be usefully involved in dealing with the
phenomenon of visualised data but could use it as a source of expression "While the original motivation of the visual representation of statistical data (kinostatistics) is intended to help in the analysis and communication of societal problems, it has great potential as material for artistic expression. Artists have a significant role in the social science aspects of such concerns, but they can also approach real-world data from a purely artistic position to express their views of reality." Although
Csuri occasionally skirts with the habitual use of computer jargon (a sign of
the times and still difficult to lose) the only weakness in his proposition
arises from his inability to foresee beyond the dataculture of his time. The
datafication of real-world and cultural phenomena has far exceeded the scope of
social science statistics which Csuri examples. His notion of artistic
involvement with the dataworld now looks a little patronising compared to
contemporary sentiment "Design
too is a well-established discipline in its own right which has potential
benefits when applied to HCI problems. An obvious example is graphic design. The
increasing technological potential available for producing high-quality
two-dimensional and three-dimensional graphics provides the stimulus for
capitalizing on graphic information display. Until relatively recently, computer
programmers and software designers tended to assume that their own intuitions
about what constituted good graphic design were adequate." (Preece et al,
1994:42) Preece
et al go on to list further contributions and appropriations from graphic
design practice. It is of course inherent in the ambitions of HCI that all
methods and strategies directed toward communication and expression will
eventually become grist to the mill. Computer
= Data = Expression What
stands out as the most useful insight of Csuri is his identification that
computer art practice (and I shall take the liberty to add design practice) will
essentially develop as an engagement with data. This observation redirects our
attention to the earlier commentary regarding older production / distribution models
(see Form of the Means) and the senses in which they differ to the production monad. The effective list of genres,
Leavitt's selection, which I suggested
constituted the formulaic range of CAAD, by and large accord with the older
technological models. This is because for most genres the concluded product
exists external to the technology e.g. as
videotape, print, furniture, automobile. In Leavitt's work virtual reality (or at
least the indication of it) is the only formulation of the technology in which
the concluded product is in / on the technology. Like cycling can only happen with
a bicycle, so too is virtual reality defined and made possible by its own
technology. In this sense virtual reality is a part of its own production monad.
This naturally begs the question as to whether CAAD is divisible as two
formulaic ranges, monadic and non-monadic. In
the search for other production monads we could consider multi-media and
computer games. It might be argued that these could not be properly considered
monadic as they involve the production of data-records in material form e.g.
compact discs, which become external to the technology. I would contend that this
is a temporary phase and a technique appropriate to retailing. The use of
discrete recording media for the distribution of products will no doubt be
replaced in the fullness of time by direct electronic transfer and billing.
This
is a potential advantage from the retail point of view providing for more
accurate placement of products, greater financial control and copyright
protection. It is also in accord with the distributed development of new
technology and ultimately its physical diffusion "The
World Wide Web (WWW) provides an integrated environment to information resources
around the world. It has been adopted by educational institutions. . . (and). .
. the commercial world. Indexing tools (including automatic indexers which are
often known as spiders or robots and manual indexers such as Aliweb) are
currently being developed which will provide sophisticated searching tools for
accessing multimedia information on WWW. . . browsers and utilities are being
developed at a tremendous rate. . . around the world."
(Kelly,
1994) This
division of both production technology and cultural product as monadic and
non-monadic type is the point where CAAD departs from conventional art and
design technologies. In the monadic form the 'tool' is no longer part of the
effort of expression, it is directly part of the expression itself, it has the
same status as 'medium'. As for the ideas of function and functionality, in
the monadic system these are entirely dependent on the intentions concerning
what is to be expressed because the only clarifying unity which sustains the
technology as being of a piece, is that of data. Our
interpretation of what constitutes a 'technology' is largely a matter of
subjective classification. All technologies are built on sub technologies and
are used in relation to other technologies. For the major part therefore our
definitions of technologies have largely been through a clear recognition of
their functions, the purposes we put them to. Computer / new / information
technology we are accustomed to seeing as of one sort. Through the notion of
production, having classified this 'one' technology into two formulations of
it, how do they exist together? I suspect that the different role of function in
the monadic and non-monadic formulations gives rise to cross purposes. That
elements of monadic production concerns, manifested either as environment,
artefact or product would begin to confuse the very clear non-monadic
specification of utility. The result metaphorically and actually is a tool of
byzantine complexity, at the moment this amounts to no more than the graphic
user interface in a CAD system, the theoretical indication is it will progress
beyond this.
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